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2
3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 Richard Gibson and Heriberto Valiente,

Case No. 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA

7 Plaintiffs,

ORDER

8 v.

9 MGM Resorts International, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 This matter is before the Court on the parties' Stipulated Protective Order (ECF No. 130).
12 The parties request that the Court enter a protective order to govern their exchange of confidential
13 information. However, the parties fail to state the governing standard for filing documents under
14 seal with the Court. This order reminds counsel that there is a presumption of public access to
15 judicial files and records. A party seeking to file a confidential document under seal must file a
16 motion to seal and must comply with the Ninth Circuit's directives in *Kamakana v. City and*
17 *County of Honolulu*, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) and *Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group,*
18 *LLC*, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016).

19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties' Stipulated Protective Order (ECF No.
20 130) is **granted subject to the following modifications:**

- 21
- 22 • The first sentence in paragraph 11(b)—Judicial Intervention—is modified to
23 remove the following language: “may (i) seek informal dispute resolution with the
24 Court if such process can be mutually agreed upon with the designating party; or
25 (ii)”
 - 26 • The first sentence in paragraph 12—Action by the Court—is modified to read:
27 “Applications to the Court for an order relating to documents designated
28 Confidential or Highly Confidential Information shall be by motion or
stipulation.”

- 1 • The Court has adopted electronic filing procedures. Attorneys must file
2 documents under seal using the Court’s electronic filing procedures. *See* Local
3 Rule IA 10-5. Papers filed with the Court under seal must be accompanied with a
4 concurrently-filed motion for leave to file those documents under seal. *See* Local
5 Rule IA 10-5(a).
- 6 • The Court has approved the instant protective order to facilitate discovery
7 exchanges, but there has been no showing, and the Court has not found, that any
8 specific documents are secret or confidential. The parties have not provided
9 specific facts supported by declarations or concrete examples to establish that a
10 protective order is required to protect any specific trade secret or other confidential
11 information pursuant to Rule 26(c) or that disclosure would cause an identifiable
12 and significant harm.
- 13 • All motions to seal shall address the standard articulated in *Ctr. for Auto Safety*
14 and explain why that standard has been met. 809 F.3d at 1097.
- 15 • Specifically, a party seeking to seal judicial records bears the burden of meeting
16 the “compelling reasons” standard, as previously articulated in *Kamakana*. 447
17 F.3d 1172. Under the compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only
18 when it finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling,
19 without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.’” *Ctr. for Auto Safety*, 809 F.3d at
20 1097. (quoting *Kamakana*, 447 F.3d at 1179). “The court must then
21 ‘conscientiously balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who
22 seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.’” *Ctr. for Auto Safety*, 809 F.3d at
23 1097.
- 24 • There is an exception to the compelling reasons standard where a party may satisfy
25 the less exacting “good cause” standard for sealed materials attached to a
26 discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case. *Id.* “The good cause
27 language comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protective
28 orders in the discovery process: ‘The court may, for good cause, issue an order to

1 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
2 burden or expense.” *Id.* (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)). “For good cause to exist, the
3 party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm
4 will result if no protective order is granted.” *Phillips v. General Motors*, 307 F.3d
5 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002).

- 6 • The labels of “dispositive” and “nondispositive” will not be the determinative
7 factor for deciding which test to apply because the focal consideration is “whether
8 the motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” *Ctr. for Auto*
9 *Safety*, 809 F.3d at 1101.
- 10 • The fact that the Court has entered the instant stipulated protective order and that a
11 party has designated a document as confidential pursuant to that protective order
12 does not, standing alone, establish sufficient grounds to seal a filed document. *See*
13 *Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003); *see*
14 *also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co.*, 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). If
15 the sole ground for a motion to seal is that the opposing party (or non-party) has
16 designated a document as confidential, the designator shall file (within seven days
17 of the filing of the motion to seal) either (1) a declaration establishing sufficient
18 justification for sealing each document at issue or (2) a notice of withdrawal of the
19 designation(s) and consent to unsealing. If neither filing is made, the Court may
20 order the document(s) unsealed without further notice.
- 21 • To the extent any aspect of the stipulated protective order may conflict with this
22 order or Local Rule IA 10-5, that aspect of the stipulated protective order is hereby
23 superseded with this order.

24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 DATED: July 24, 2023.

26 
27 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS
28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE